Reapply POSIX ACL changes.

- New, unified implementation of POSIX permission and ACL handling.  The
    new ACLs now store the POSIX ACL MASK/CLASS_OBJ permission mask, and
    they allow to inherit the S_ISGID bit.  ACL inheritance now really
    works as desired, in a limited, but theoretically equivalent fashion
    even for non-Cygwin processes.

    To accommodate Windows default ACLs, the new code ignores SYSTEM and
    Administrators group permissions when computing the MASK/CLASS_OBJ
    permission mask on old ACLs, and it doesn't deny access to SYSTEM and
    Administrators group based on the value of MASK/CLASS_OBJ when
    creating the new ACLs.

    The new code now handles the S_ISGID bit on directories as on Linux:
    Setting S_ISGID on a directory causes new files and subdirs created
    within to inherit its group, rather than the primary group of the user
    who created the file.  This only works for files and directories
    created by Cygwin processes.

2015-05-29  Corinna Vinschen  <corinna@vinschen.de>

	Reapply POSIX ACL changes.

	* utils.xml (setfacl): Show new option output.
	(getfacl): Show new option output.

	* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Check for Cygwin "standard" ACL.
	Apply umask, if so.  Align comments.
	* security.cc (set_created_file_access): Fix permission masking by
	incoming requested file mode.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Apply mask only in terms of execute bit
	for SYSTEM and Admins group.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Don't create DENY ACEs for USER and
	GROUP entries if they are the same as USER_OBJ or GROUP_OBJ.

	* fhandler.h (fhandler_pty_slave::facl): Add prototype.
	* fhandler_tty.cc (fhandler_pty_slave::facl): New method.
	(fhandler_pty_slave::fchown): Fix uid/gid handling.
	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Drop superfluous class_idx variable.
	Simplify and move around code in a few places.  To improve ACL
	readability, add r/w permissions to Admins ACE appended to pty ACL.
	Add comment to explain Windows ACE Mask filtering being in the way of
	creating a real CLASS_OBJ.
	(get_posix_access): Fake CLASS_OBJ for ptys.  Explain why.
	* security.cc (get_object_attribute): Add S_IFCHR flag to attributes
	when calling get_posix_access.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Move merging group perms into owner
	perms in case of owner == group after mask has been computed.  Take
	mask into account when doing so to avoid unnecessary ACCESS_DENIED_ACE.

	* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Only set saw_group_obj flag if we saw
	the ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.

	* fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Deliberatly
	set GROUP_OBJ and CLASS_OBJ perms to new group perms.  Add comment
	to explain why.
	* security.cc (set_created_file_access): Ditto.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Replace previous patch.  Return
	EINVAL if uid and/or guid is invalid and not backed by an actual
	Windows account.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Workaround owner/group SIDs being NULL.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Handle files with owner == group.
	Rephrase switch statement checking against unfiltered a_type value.
	(get_posix_access): Handle files with owner == group.

	* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Don't use GROUP_OBJ access to fix up
	CLASS_OBJ mask on old-style ACLs.  Fix a comment.

	* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Always make sure Admins have
	WRITE_DAC and WRITE_OWNER permissions.
	* security.h (create_object_sd_from_attribute): Drop handle parameter
	from prototype.
	* security.cc (create_object_sd_from_attribute): Drop handle parameter.
	Just create the standard POSIXy security descriptor.
	(set_object_attribute): Accommodate dropped paramter in call to
	create_object_sd_from_attribute.
	* fhandler_tty.cc: Ditto, throughout.

	* fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Fix typo in
	mask computation.

	* fhandler.cc (fhandler_base::open_with_arch): Call open with mode
	not umasked.
	(fhandler_base::open): Explicitely umask mode on NFS here.  Call new
	set_created_file_access rather than set_file_attribute.
	* fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Reimplement
	setting permissions on filesystems supporting ACLs using the new
	set_posix_access call.
	(fhandler_disk_file::fchown): Ditto.
	(fhandler_disk_file::mkdir): Call new set_created_file_access rather
	than set_file_attribute.
	* fhandler_socket.cc (fhandler_socket::bind): Don't umask here.  Add
	WRITE_OWNER access to allow writing group in case of SGID bit set.
	Call new set_created_file_access rather than set_file_attribute.
	* path.cc (symlink_worker): Call new set_created_file_access rather
	than set_file_attribute.
	* sec_acl.cc (searchace): Un-staticize.
	(set_posix_access): New, complementary functionality to
	get_posix_access.
	(setacl): Implement in terms of get_posix_access/set_posix_access.
	(get_posix_access): Add handling for just created files requiring
	their first Cygwin ACL.  Fix new_style recognition.  Handle SGID
	bit.  For old-style ACLs, ignore SYSTEM and Administrators when
	computing the {DEF_}CLASS_OBJ perms.
	* security.cc (get_file_sd): Revamp comment.  Change and (hopefully)
	speed up inheritance processing for just created files.
	(alloc_sd): Remove.
	(set_security_attribute): Call set_posix_access instead of alloc_sd.
	(get_object_attribute): Fix return value.
	(create_object_sd_from_attribute): Call set_posix_access instead of
	alloc_sd.
	(set_file_attribute): Remove.
	(set_created_file_access): New function implemented in terms of
	get_posix_access/set_posix_access.
	* security.h (set_file_attribute): Remove prototype.
	(set_created_file_access): Add prototype.
	(searchace): Ditto.
	(set_posix_access): Ditto.
	* syscalls.cc (open): Call open_with_arch with mode not umasked.

	* sec_acl.cc: Change preceeding comment explaining new-style ACLs.
	Describe how to generate deny ACEs in more detail.  Accommodate the
	fact that a NULL deny ACE is used for {DEF_}CLASS_OBJ, rather than
	a special Cygwin ACE.  Improve further comments.
	(CYG_ACE_NEW_STYLE): Define.
	(get_posix_access): Change from Cygwin ACE to NULL deny ACE.  Fix
	CLASS_OBJ handling to generate CLASS_OBJ and DEF_CLASS_OBJ from a single
	NULL deny ACE if the inheritance flags say so.
	* sec_helper.cc (well_known_cygwin_sid): Remove.
	* security.h (well_known_cygwin_sid): Drop declaration.

	* sec_acl.cc (CYG_ACE_ISBITS_TO_WIN): Fix typo.
	(get_posix_access): Rename index variable from i to idx.  Define only
	once at top level.

	* security.cc (add_access_allowed_ace): Drop unused parameter "offset".
	Accommodate throughout.
	(add_access_denied_ace): Ditto.
	* sec_acl.cc: Accommodate above change throughout.
	* security.h (add_access_allowed_ace): Adjust prototype to above change.
	(add_access_denied_ace): Ditto.

	* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Handle multiple ACEs for the
	owner and primary group of the file.  Handle the default primary
	group ACE as DEF_GROUP_OBJ entry if the directory has the S_ISGID bit
	set.  Add comments.  Minor code rearrangements.

	Preliminary read side implementation of new permission handling.
	* acl.h (MAX_ACL_ENTRIES): Raise to 2730.  Add comment to explain.
	* sec_acl.cc:  Add leading comment to explain new ACL style.
	Add definitions and macros to use for bits in new Cygwin ACL.
	(DENY_RWX): New mask value for all temporary deny bits.
	(getace): Add bool parameter to decide when leaving all bits intact,
	rather than filtering them per the already set bits.
	(get_posix_access): New function, taking over functionality to read
	POSIX ACL from SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR.
	(getacl): Just call get_posix_access.
	* sec_helper.cc (well_known_cygwin_sid): Define.
	* security.cc (get_attribute_from_acl): Remove.
	(get_info_from_sd): Remove.
	(get_reg_sd): Call get_posix_access instead of get_info_from_sd.
	(get_file_attribute): Ditto.
	(get_object_attribute): Ditto.
	* security.h (well_known_cygwin_sid): Declare.
	(get_posix_access): Add prototype.

	* Throughout, use simpler ACE macros from Windows' accctrl.h.

	* getfacl.c (main): Special-case SYSTEM and Admins group.  Add comments.

	* setfacl.c: Align more to Linux tool.
	(delacl): New function to delete acl entries only.
	(modacl): Drop delete functionality.  Add handling of recomputing the
	mask and default mask values.
	(delallacl): Rename from delacl.
	(setfacl): Call delacl in Delete case.  Call delallacl in DeleteAll
	and DeleteDef case.
	(usage): Accommodate new options.  Rearrange and rephrase slightly.
	(longopts): Emit 'x' in --delete case.  Add --no-mask and --mask
	options.
	(opts): Add -x and -n options.
	(main): Handle -d and -x the same.  Handle -n and --mask options.
	Drop handling for -r option.

	* getfacl.c (usage): Align more closely to Linux version.  Add new
	options -c, -e, -E.  Change formatting to accommodate longer options.
	(longopts): Rename --noname to --numeric.  Keep --noname for backward
	compatibility.  Add --omit-header, --all-effective and --no-effective
	options.
	(opts): Add -c, -e and -E option.
	(main): Handle new -c, -e, and -E options.

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
This commit is contained in:
Corinna Vinschen 2015-06-24 11:52:29 +02:00
parent 049eeecba7
commit bc444e5aa4
18 changed files with 1899 additions and 1439 deletions

View File

@ -1,3 +1,155 @@
2015-11-18 Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
Reapply POSIX ACL changes.
* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Check for Cygwin "standard" ACL.
Apply umask, if so. Align comments.
* security.cc (set_created_file_access): Fix permission masking by
incoming requested file mode.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Apply mask only in terms of execute bit
for SYSTEM and Admins group.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Don't create DENY ACEs for USER and
GROUP entries if they are the same as USER_OBJ or GROUP_OBJ.
* fhandler.h (fhandler_pty_slave::facl): Add prototype.
* fhandler_tty.cc (fhandler_pty_slave::facl): New method.
(fhandler_pty_slave::fchown): Fix uid/gid handling.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Drop superfluous class_idx variable.
Simplify and move around code in a few places. To improve ACL
readability, add r/w permissions to Admins ACE appended to pty ACL.
Add comment to explain Windows ACE Mask filtering being in the way of
creating a real CLASS_OBJ.
(get_posix_access): Fake CLASS_OBJ for ptys. Explain why.
* security.cc (get_object_attribute): Add S_IFCHR flag to attributes
when calling get_posix_access.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Move merging group perms into owner
perms in case of owner == group after mask has been computed. Take
mask into account when doing so to avoid unnecessary ACCESS_DENIED_ACE.
* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Only set saw_group_obj flag if we saw
the ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.
* fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Deliberatly
set GROUP_OBJ and CLASS_OBJ perms to new group perms. Add comment
to explain why.
* security.cc (set_created_file_access): Ditto.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Replace previous patch. Return
EINVAL if uid and/or guid is invalid and not backed by an actual
Windows account.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Workaround owner/group SIDs being NULL.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Handle files with owner == group.
Rephrase switch statement checking against unfiltered a_type value.
(get_posix_access): Handle files with owner == group.
* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Don't use GROUP_OBJ access to fix up
CLASS_OBJ mask on old-style ACLs. Fix a comment.
* sec_acl.cc (set_posix_access): Always make sure Admins have
WRITE_DAC and WRITE_OWNER permissions.
* security.h (create_object_sd_from_attribute): Drop handle parameter
from prototype.
* security.cc (create_object_sd_from_attribute): Drop handle parameter.
Just create the standard POSIXy security descriptor.
(set_object_attribute): Accommodate dropped paramter in call to
create_object_sd_from_attribute.
* fhandler_tty.cc: Ditto, throughout.
* fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Fix typo in
mask computation.
* fhandler.cc (fhandler_base::open_with_arch): Call open with mode
not umasked.
(fhandler_base::open): Explicitely umask mode on NFS here. Call new
set_created_file_access rather than set_file_attribute.
* fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Reimplement
setting permissions on filesystems supporting ACLs using the new
set_posix_access call.
(fhandler_disk_file::fchown): Ditto.
(fhandler_disk_file::mkdir): Call new set_created_file_access rather
than set_file_attribute.
* fhandler_socket.cc (fhandler_socket::bind): Don't umask here. Add
WRITE_OWNER access to allow writing group in case of SGID bit set.
Call new set_created_file_access rather than set_file_attribute.
* path.cc (symlink_worker): Call new set_created_file_access rather
than set_file_attribute.
* sec_acl.cc (searchace): Un-staticize.
(set_posix_access): New, complementary functionality to
get_posix_access.
(setacl): Implement in terms of get_posix_access/set_posix_access.
(get_posix_access): Add handling for just created files requiring
their first Cygwin ACL. Fix new_style recognition. Handle SGID
bit. For old-style ACLs, ignore SYSTEM and Administrators when
computing the {DEF_}CLASS_OBJ perms.
* security.cc (get_file_sd): Revamp comment. Change and (hopefully)
speed up inheritance processing for just created files.
(alloc_sd): Remove.
(set_security_attribute): Call set_posix_access instead of alloc_sd.
(get_object_attribute): Fix return value.
(create_object_sd_from_attribute): Call set_posix_access instead of
alloc_sd.
(set_file_attribute): Remove.
(set_created_file_access): New function implemented in terms of
get_posix_access/set_posix_access.
* security.h (set_file_attribute): Remove prototype.
(set_created_file_access): Add prototype.
(searchace): Ditto.
(set_posix_access): Ditto.
* syscalls.cc (open): Call open_with_arch with mode not umasked.
* sec_acl.cc: Change preceeding comment explaining new-style ACLs.
Describe how to generate deny ACEs in more detail. Accommodate the
fact that a NULL deny ACE is used for {DEF_}CLASS_OBJ, rather than
a special Cygwin ACE. Improve further comments.
(CYG_ACE_NEW_STYLE): Define.
(get_posix_access): Change from Cygwin ACE to NULL deny ACE. Fix
CLASS_OBJ handling to generate CLASS_OBJ and DEF_CLASS_OBJ from a single
NULL deny ACE if the inheritance flags say so.
* sec_helper.cc (well_known_cygwin_sid): Remove.
* security.h (well_known_cygwin_sid): Drop declaration.
* sec_acl.cc (CYG_ACE_ISBITS_TO_WIN): Fix typo.
(get_posix_access): Rename index variable from i to idx. Define only
once at top level.
* security.cc (add_access_allowed_ace): Drop unused parameter "offset".
Accommodate throughout.
(add_access_denied_ace): Ditto.
* sec_acl.cc: Accommodate above change throughout.
* security.h (add_access_allowed_ace): Adjust prototype to above change.
(add_access_denied_ace): Ditto.
* sec_acl.cc (get_posix_access): Handle multiple ACEs for the
owner and primary group of the file. Handle the default primary
group ACE as DEF_GROUP_OBJ entry if the directory has the S_ISGID bit
set. Add comments. Minor code rearrangements.
Preliminary read side implementation of new permission handling.
* acl.h (MAX_ACL_ENTRIES): Raise to 2730. Add comment to explain.
* sec_acl.cc: Add leading comment to explain new ACL style.
Add definitions and macros to use for bits in new Cygwin ACL.
(DENY_RWX): New mask value for all temporary deny bits.
(getace): Add bool parameter to decide when leaving all bits intact,
rather than filtering them per the already set bits.
(get_posix_access): New function, taking over functionality to read
POSIX ACL from SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR.
(getacl): Just call get_posix_access.
* sec_helper.cc (well_known_cygwin_sid): Define.
* security.cc (get_attribute_from_acl): Remove.
(get_info_from_sd): Remove.
(get_reg_sd): Call get_posix_access instead of get_info_from_sd.
(get_file_attribute): Ditto.
(get_object_attribute): Ditto.
* security.h (well_known_cygwin_sid): Declare.
(get_posix_access): Add prototype.
* Throughout, use simpler ACE macros from Windows' accctrl.h.
2015-11-18 Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
* include/cygwin/version.h (CYGWIN_VERSION_DLL_MAJOR): Bump to 2004.

View File

@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ fhandler_base::open_with_arch (int flags, mode_t mode)
{
int res;
if (!(res = (archetype && archetype->io_handle)
|| open (flags, (mode & 07777) & ~cygheap->umask)))
|| open (flags, mode & 07777)))
{
if (archetype)
delete archetype;
@ -662,9 +662,10 @@ fhandler_base::open (int flags, mode_t mode)
+ p->EaNameLength + 1);
memset (nfs_attr, 0, sizeof (fattr3));
nfs_attr->type = NF3REG;
nfs_attr->mode = mode;
nfs_attr->mode = (mode & 07777) & ~cygheap->umask;
}
else if (!has_acls () && !(mode & (S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)))
else if (!has_acls ()
&& !(mode & ~cygheap->umask & (S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)))
/* If mode has no write bits set, and ACLs are not used, we set
the DOS R/O attribute. */
file_attributes |= FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY;
@ -716,7 +717,7 @@ fhandler_base::open (int flags, mode_t mode)
This is the result of a discussion on the samba-technical list, starting at
http://lists.samba.org/archive/samba-technical/2008-July/060247.html */
if (io.Information == FILE_CREATED && has_acls ())
set_file_attribute (fh, pc, ILLEGAL_UID, ILLEGAL_GID, S_JUSTCREATED | mode);
set_created_file_access (fh, pc, mode);
/* If you O_TRUNC a file on Linux, the data is truncated, but the EAs are
preserved. If you open a file on Windows with FILE_OVERWRITE{_IF} or

View File

@ -1557,6 +1557,7 @@ class fhandler_pty_slave: public fhandler_pty_common
select_record *select_read (select_stuff *);
virtual char const *ttyname () { return pc.dev.name; }
int __reg2 fstat (struct stat *buf);
int __reg3 facl (int, int, struct acl *);
int __reg1 fchmod (mode_t mode);
int __reg2 fchown (uid_t uid, gid_t gid);

View File

@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ int __reg1
fhandler_disk_file::fchmod (mode_t mode)
{
extern int chmod_device (path_conv& pc, mode_t mode);
int res = -1;
int ret = -1;
int oret = 0;
NTSTATUS status;
IO_STATUS_BLOCK io;
@ -893,17 +893,45 @@ fhandler_disk_file::fchmod (mode_t mode)
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
else
res = 0;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (pc.has_acls ())
{
if (pc.isdir ())
mode |= S_IFDIR;
if (!set_file_attribute (get_handle (), pc,
ILLEGAL_UID, ILLEGAL_GID, mode))
res = 0;
security_descriptor sd, sd_ret;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
aclent_t *aclp;
int nentries, idx;
if (!get_file_sd (get_handle (), pc, sd, false))
{
aclp = (aclent_t *) tp.c_get ();
if ((nentries = get_posix_access (sd, NULL, &uid, &gid,
aclp, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES)) >= 0)
{
/* Overwrite ACL permissions as required by POSIX 1003.1e
draft 17. */
aclp[0].a_perm = (mode >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
/* Deliberate deviation from POSIX 1003.1e here. We're not
writing CLASS_OBJ *or* GROUP_OBJ, but both. Otherwise we're
going to be in constant trouble with user expectations. */
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, GROUP_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = (mode >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if (nentries > MIN_ACL_ENTRIES
&& (idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, CLASS_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = (mode >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, OTHER_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = mode & S_IRWXO;
if (pc.isdir ())
mode |= S_IFDIR;
if (set_posix_access (mode, uid, gid, aclp, nentries, sd_ret,
pc.fs_is_samba ()))
ret = set_file_sd (get_handle (), pc, sd_ret, false);
}
}
}
/* If the mode has any write bits set, the DOS R/O flag is in the way. */
@ -940,20 +968,28 @@ fhandler_disk_file::fchmod (mode_t mode)
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
else
res = 0;
ret = 0;
}
out:
if (oret)
close_fs ();
return res;
return ret;
}
int __reg2
fhandler_disk_file::fchown (uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
int oret = 0;
int ret = -1;
security_descriptor sd, sd_ret;
mode_t attr = pc.isdir () ? S_IFDIR : 0;
uid_t old_uid;
gid_t old_gid;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
aclent_t *aclp;
int nentries;
if (!pc.has_acls ())
{
@ -970,52 +1006,71 @@ fhandler_disk_file::fchown (uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
return -1;
}
mode_t attrib = 0;
if (pc.isdir ())
attrib |= S_IFDIR;
uid_t old_uid;
int res = get_file_attribute (get_handle (), pc, &attrib, &old_uid, NULL);
if (!res)
{
/* Typical Windows default ACLs can contain permissions for one
group, while being owned by another user/group. The permission
bits returned above are pretty much useless then. Creating a
new ACL with these useless permissions results in a potentially
broken symlink. So what we do here is to set the underlying
permissions of symlinks to a sensible value which allows the
world to read the symlink and only the new owner to change it. */
if (pc.issymlink ())
attrib = S_IFLNK | STD_RBITS | STD_WBITS;
res = set_file_attribute (get_handle (), pc, uid, gid, attrib);
/* If you're running a Samba server which has no winbind running, the
uid<->SID mapping is disfunctional. Even trying to chown to your
own account fails since the account used on the server is the UNIX
account which gets used for the standard user mapping. This is a
default mechanism which doesn't know your real Windows SID.
There are two possible error codes in different Samba releases for
this situation, one of them is unfortunately the not very significant
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Instead of relying on the error codes, we're
using the below very simple heuristic. If set_file_attribute failed,
and the original user account was either already unknown, or one of
the standard UNIX accounts, we're faking success. */
if (res == -1 && pc.fs_is_samba ())
{
PSID sid;
if (get_file_sd (get_handle (), pc, sd, false))
goto out;
if (old_uid == ILLEGAL_UID
|| ((sid = sidfromuid (old_uid, NULL)) != NO_SID
&& RtlEqualPrefixSid (sid,
well_known_samba_unix_user_fake_sid)))
{
debug_printf ("Faking chown worked on standalone Samba");
res = 0;
}
aclp = (aclent_t *) tp.c_get ();
if ((nentries = get_posix_access (sd, &attr, &old_uid, &old_gid,
aclp, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES)) < 0)
goto out;
if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID)
uid = old_uid;
if (gid == ILLEGAL_GID)
gid = old_gid;
if (uid == old_uid && gid == old_gid)
{
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Windows ACLs can contain permissions for one group, while being owned by
another user/group. The permission bits returned above are pretty much
useless then. Creating a new ACL with these useless permissions results
in a potentially broken symlink. So what we do here is to set the
underlying permissions of symlinks to a sensible value which allows the
world to read the symlink and only the new owner to change it. */
if (pc.issymlink ())
for (int idx = 0; idx < nentries; ++idx)
{
aclp[idx].a_perm |= S_IROTH;
if (aclp[idx].a_type & USER_OBJ)
aclp[idx].a_perm |= S_IWOTH;
}
if (set_posix_access (attr, uid, gid, aclp, nentries, sd_ret,
pc.fs_is_samba ()))
ret = set_file_sd (get_handle (), pc, sd_ret, true);
/* If you're running a Samba server with no winbind, the uid<->SID mapping
is disfunctional. Even trying to chown to your own account fails since
the account used on the server is the UNIX account which gets used for
the standard user mapping. This is a default mechanism which doesn't
know your real Windows SID. There are two possible error codes in
different Samba releases for this situation, one of them unfortunately
the not very significant STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Instead of relying on
the error codes, we're using the below very simple heuristic.
If set_file_sd failed, and the original user account was either already
unknown, or one of the standard UNIX accounts, we're faking success. */
if (ret == -1 && pc.fs_is_samba ())
{
PSID sid;
if (uid == old_uid
|| ((sid = sidfromuid (old_uid, NULL)) != NO_SID
&& RtlEqualPrefixSid (sid,
well_known_samba_unix_user_fake_sid)))
{
debug_printf ("Faking chown worked on standalone Samba");
ret = 0;
}
}
out:
if (oret)
close_fs ();
return res;
return ret;
}
int __reg3
@ -1774,10 +1829,11 @@ fhandler_disk_file::mkdir (mode_t mode)
p, plen);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
/* Set the "directory attribute" so that pc.isdir() returns correct
value in subsequent function calls. */
pc.file_attributes (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY);
if (has_acls ())
set_file_attribute (dir, pc, ILLEGAL_UID, ILLEGAL_GID,
S_JUSTCREATED | S_IFDIR
| ((mode & 07777) & ~cygheap->umask));
set_created_file_access (dir, pc, mode & 07777);
NtClose (dir);
res = 0;
}

View File

@ -1065,10 +1065,10 @@ fhandler_socket::bind (const struct sockaddr *name, int namelen)
sin.sin_port = ntohs (sin.sin_port);
debug_printf ("AF_LOCAL: socket bound to port %u", sin.sin_port);
mode_t mode = adjust_socket_file_mode ((S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)
& ~cygheap->umask);
mode_t mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IROTH | S_IWOTH;
DWORD fattr = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM;
if (!(mode & (S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) && !pc.has_acls ())
if (!pc.has_acls ()
&& !(mode & ~cygheap->umask & (S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)))
fattr |= FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY;
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa = sec_none_nih;
NTSTATUS status;
@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ fhandler_socket::bind (const struct sockaddr *name, int namelen)
I don't know what setting that is or how to recognize such a share,
so for now we don't request WRITE_DAC on remote drives. */
if (pc.has_acls () && !pc.isremote ())
access |= READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC;
access |= READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER;
status = NtCreateFile (&fh, access, pc.get_object_attr (attr, sa), &io,
NULL, fattr, 0, FILE_CREATE,
@ -1104,8 +1104,7 @@ fhandler_socket::bind (const struct sockaddr *name, int namelen)
else
{
if (pc.has_acls ())
set_file_attribute (fh, pc, ILLEGAL_UID, ILLEGAL_GID,
S_JUSTCREATED | mode);
set_created_file_access (fh, pc, mode);
char buf[sizeof (SOCKET_COOKIE) + 80];
__small_sprintf (buf, "%s%u %c ", SOCKET_COOKIE, sin.sin_port,
get_socket_type () == SOCK_STREAM ? 's'

View File

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ details. */
#include "winsup.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
#include <cygwin/kd.h>
#include "cygerrno.h"
#include "security.h"
@ -388,9 +389,8 @@ fhandler_pty_slave::open (int flags, mode_t)
sd.malloc (sizeof (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR));
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa = { sizeof (SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), NULL, TRUE };
if (!create_object_sd_from_attribute (NULL, myself->uid, myself->gid,
S_IFCHR | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP,
sd))
if (!create_object_sd_from_attribute (myself->uid, myself->gid,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, sd))
sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) sd;
acquire_output_mutex (INFINITE);
inuse = get_ttyp ()->create_inuse (&sa);
@ -1049,6 +1049,62 @@ fhandler_pty_slave::fstat (struct stat *st)
return 0;
}
int __reg3
fhandler_pty_slave::facl (int cmd, int nentries, aclent_t *aclbufp)
{
int res = -1;
bool to_close = false;
security_descriptor sd;
mode_t attr = S_IFCHR;
switch (cmd)
{
case SETACL:
if (!aclsort32 (nentries, 0, aclbufp))
set_errno (ENOTSUP);
break;
case GETACL:
if (!aclbufp)
{
set_errno (EFAULT);
break;
}
/*FALLTHRU*/
case GETACLCNT:
if (!input_available_event)
{
char buf[MAX_PATH];
shared_name (buf, INPUT_AVAILABLE_EVENT, get_minor ());
input_available_event = OpenEvent (READ_CONTROL, TRUE, buf);
if (input_available_event)
to_close = true;
}
if (!input_available_event
|| get_object_sd (input_available_event, sd))
{
res = get_posix_access (NULL, &attr, NULL, NULL, aclbufp, nentries);
if (aclbufp && res == MIN_ACL_ENTRIES)
{
aclbufp[0].a_perm = S_IROTH | S_IWOTH;
aclbufp[0].a_id = 18;
aclbufp[1].a_id = 544;
}
break;
}
if (cmd == GETACL)
res = get_posix_access (sd, &attr, NULL, NULL, aclbufp, nentries);
else
res = get_posix_access (sd, &attr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
break;
default:
set_errno (EINVAL);
break;
}
if (to_close)
CloseHandle (input_available_event);
return res;
}
/* Helper function for fchmod and fchown, which just opens all handles
and signals success via bool return. */
bool
@ -1121,7 +1177,7 @@ fhandler_pty_slave::fchmod (mode_t mode)
sd.malloc (sizeof (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR));
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
if (!get_object_attribute (input_available_event, &uid, &gid, NULL)
&& !create_object_sd_from_attribute (NULL, uid, gid, S_IFCHR | mode, sd))
&& !create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid, gid, mode, sd))
ret = fch_set_sd (sd, false);
errout:
if (to_close)
@ -1151,11 +1207,13 @@ fhandler_pty_slave::fchown (uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
if (!get_object_attribute (input_available_event, &o_uid, &o_gid, &mode))
{
if ((uid == ILLEGAL_UID || uid == o_uid)
&& (gid == ILLEGAL_GID || gid == o_gid))
if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID)
uid = o_uid;
if (gid == ILLEGAL_GID)
gid = o_gid;
if (uid == o_uid && gid == o_gid)
ret = 0;
else if (!create_object_sd_from_attribute (input_available_event,
uid, gid, S_IFCHR | mode, sd))
else if (!create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid, gid, mode, sd))
ret = fch_set_sd (sd, true);
}
errout:
@ -1695,9 +1753,8 @@ fhandler_pty_master::setup ()
/* Create security attribute. Default permissions are 0620. */
sd.malloc (sizeof (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR));
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
if (!create_object_sd_from_attribute (NULL, myself->uid, myself->gid,
S_IFCHR | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP,
sd))
if (!create_object_sd_from_attribute (myself->uid, myself->gid,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, sd))
sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) sd;
/* Carefully check that the input_available_event didn't already exist.

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* cygwin/acl.h header file for Cygwin.
Copyright 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2010, 2014 Red Hat, Inc.
Copyright 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2010, 2014, 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
Written by C. Vinschen.
This file is part of Cygwin.
@ -25,8 +25,16 @@ extern "C" {
#define GETACL (0x1)
#define GETACLCNT (0x2)
/* Windows ACLs have a maximum size of 64K. Counting the most pessimistic way,
the maximum number of ACEs is 3276. Technet claims "approximately 1820",
which uses the length of normal user and group SIDs for the computation.
We're now going with 2730, the number of aclent_t entries matching a 32K
buffer.
On one hand, there are only a limited number of SIDs shorter than the normal
user/group SIDs, on the other hand there are no deny aclent_t entries, so we
should be fine with 32K aclbuf_t buffers provided by the caller. */
#define MIN_ACL_ENTRIES (3) // minimal acl entries from GETACLCNT
#define MAX_ACL_ENTRIES (256) // max entries of each type
#define MAX_ACL_ENTRIES (2730) // max entries of each type
// Return values of aclcheck(3) in case of error */
#define GRP_ERROR (0x1)

View File

@ -2061,10 +2061,9 @@ symlink_worker (const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, bool isdevice)
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
__leave;
}
if (win32_newpath.has_acls ())
set_file_attribute (fh, win32_newpath, ILLEGAL_UID, ILLEGAL_GID,
(io.Information == FILE_CREATED ? S_JUSTCREATED : 0)
| S_IFLNK | STD_RBITS | STD_WBITS);
if (io.Information == FILE_CREATED && win32_newpath.has_acls ())
set_created_file_access (fh, win32_newpath,
S_IFLNK | STD_RBITS | STD_WBITS);
status = NtWriteFile (fh, NULL, NULL, NULL, &io, buf, cp - buf,
NULL, NULL);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && io.Information == (ULONG) (cp - buf))

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -619,22 +619,21 @@ _recycler_sd (void *buf, bool users, bool dir)
pre-Vista permissions the same way as on Vista and later. */
RtlCreateAcl (dacl, MAX_DACL_LEN (3), ACL_REVISION);
RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (dacl, ACL_REVISION,
dir ? CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE | OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE
dir ? SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT
: NO_INHERITANCE,
FILE_ALL_ACCESS, well_known_admins_sid);
RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (dacl, ACL_REVISION,
dir ? CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE | OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE
dir ? SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT
: NO_INHERITANCE,
FILE_ALL_ACCESS, well_known_system_sid);
if (users)
RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (dacl, ACL_REVISION, NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE,
RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (dacl, ACL_REVISION, INHERIT_NO_PROPAGATE,
FILE_GENERIC_READ | FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE
| FILE_APPEND_DATA | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES,
well_known_users_sid);
else
RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (dacl, ACL_REVISION,
dir ? CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
| OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE
dir ? SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT
: NO_INHERITANCE,
FILE_ALL_ACCESS, cygheap->user.sid ());
LPVOID ace;

View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ details. */
#include "winsup.h"
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
#include "cygerrno.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "path.h"
@ -34,7 +35,6 @@ static GENERIC_MAPPING NO_COPY_RO file_mapping = { FILE_GENERIC_READ,
FILE_GENERIC_WRITE,
FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE,
FILE_ALL_ACCESS };
LONG
get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
bool justcreated)
@ -85,62 +85,46 @@ get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
return -1;
}
}
/* Ok, so we have a security descriptor now. Unfortunately, if you want
to know if an ACE is inherited from the parent object, you can't just
call NtQuerySecurityObject once. The problem is this:
/* We have a security descriptor now. Unfortunately, if you want to know
if an ACE is inherited from the parent object, this isn't sufficient.
In the simple case, the SDs control word contains one of the
SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED or SE_DACL_PROTECTED flags, or at least one of
the ACEs has the INHERITED_ACE flag set. In all of these cases the
GetSecurityInfo function calls NtQuerySecurityObject only once, too,
apparently because it figures that the DACL is self-sufficient, which
it usually is. Windows Explorer, for instance, takes great care to
set these flags in a security descriptor if you change the ACL in the
GUI property dialog.
the ACEs has the INHERITED_ACE flag set. In all of these cases we
know the DACL has been inherited.
The tricky case is if none of these flags is set in the SD. That means
the information whether or not an ACE has been inherited is not available
in the DACL of the object. In this case GetSecurityInfo also fetches the
SD from the parent directory and tests if the object's SD contains
inherited ACEs from the parent. The below code is closly emulating the
behaviour of GetSecurityInfo so we can get rid of this advapi32 dependency.
If none of these flags is set in the SD, the information whether
or not an ACE has been inherited is not available in the DACL of the
object. In this case GetSecurityInfo fetches the SD from the parent
directory and tests if the object's SD contains inherited ACEs from the
parent.
However, this functionality is slow, and the extra information is only
required when the file has been created and the permissions are about
to be set to POSIX permissions. Therefore we only use it in case the
file just got created.
Note that we're not testing the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED and
SE_DACL_PROTECTED flags here because we know the state the file's SD
is in. Since we're creating all files with a NULL descriptor, the DACL
is either inherited from the parent, or it's the default DACL. In
neither case, one of these flags is set.
Note that GetSecurityInfo has a problem on 5.1 and 5.2 kernels. Sometimes
it returns ERROR_INVALID_ADDRESS if a former request for the parent
directories' SD used NtQuerySecurityObject, rather than GetSecurityInfo
as well. See http://cygwin.com/ml/cygwin-developers/2011-03/msg00027.html
for the solution. This problem does not occur with the below code, so
the workaround has been removed. */
For speed, we're not calling RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject
anymore (but keep the code here for reference). Rather we just test
if one of the parent's ACEs is inheritable. If so, we know we inherited
it and set the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED flag. If not, we may assume our
object's DACL is the default DACL.
This functionality is slow and the extra information is only required
when the file has been created and the permissions are about to be set
to POSIX permissions. Therefore we only use it in case the file just
got created. */
if (justcreated)
{
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL ctrl;
ULONG dummy;
PACL dacl;
BOOLEAN exists, def;
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
UNICODE_STRING dirname;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd, nsd;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
/* Check SDs control flags. If SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED or
SE_DACL_PROTECTED is set we're done. */
RtlGetControlSecurityDescriptor (sd, &ctrl, &dummy);
if (ctrl & (SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SE_DACL_PROTECTED))
return 0;
/* Otherwise iterate over the ACEs and see if any one of them has the
INHERITED_ACE flag set. If so, we're done. */
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd, &exists, &dacl, &def))
&& exists && dacl)
for (ULONG idx = 0; idx < dacl->AceCount; ++idx)
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (dacl, idx, (PVOID *) &ace))
&& (ace->Header.AceFlags & INHERITED_ACE))
return 0;
/* Otherwise, open the parent directory with READ_CONTROL... */
/* Open the parent directory with READ_CONTROL... */
RtlSplitUnicodePath (pc.get_nt_native_path (), &dirname, NULL);
InitializeObjectAttributes (&attr, &dirname, pc.objcaseinsensitive (),
NULL, NULL);
@ -164,12 +148,14 @@ get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
&dirname, status);
return 0;
}
#if 0
/* ... and create a new security descriptor in which all inherited ACEs
are marked with the INHERITED_ACE flag. For a description of the
undocumented RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject function from
ntdll.dll see the MSDN man page for the advapi32 function
ConvertToAutoInheritPrivateObjectSecurity. Fortunately the latter
is just a shim. */
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR nsd;
status = RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject (psd, sd, &nsd, NULL,
pc.isdir (),
&file_mapping);
@ -185,6 +171,36 @@ get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
len = RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor (nsd);
memcpy ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) sd, nsd, len);
RtlDeleteSecurityObject (&nsd);
#else
/* ... and check the parent descriptor for inheritable ACEs matching
our current object type (file/dir). The simple truth in our case
is, either the parent dir had inheritable ACEs and all our ACEs are
inherited, or the parent dir didn't have inheritable ACEs and all
our ACEs are taken from the default DACL. */
bool inherited = false;
BYTE search_flags = pc.isdir () ? SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT
: SUB_OBJECTS_ONLY_INHERIT;
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (psd, &exists, &dacl, &def))
&& exists && dacl)
for (ULONG idx = 0; idx < dacl->AceCount; ++idx)
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (dacl, idx, (PVOID *) &ace))
&& (ace->Header.AceFlags & search_flags))
{
inherited = true;
break;
}
/* Then, if the parent descriptor contained inheritable ACEs, we mark
the SD as SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED. Note that this requires the
matching check in get_posix_access. If we ever revert to
RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject, the check in get_posix_access
has to test every single ACE for the INHERITED_ACE flag again. */
if (inherited
&& NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd, &exists, &dacl,
&def))
&& exists && dacl)
RtlSetControlSecurityDescriptor (sd, SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED,
SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED);
#endif
}
return 0;
}
@ -234,213 +250,6 @@ set_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd, bool is_chown)
return res;
}
static void
get_attribute_from_acl (mode_t *attribute, PACL acl, PSID owner_sid,
PSID group_sid, bool grp_member)
{
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
mode_t allow = 0;
mode_t deny = 0;
mode_t *flags, *anti;
bool isownergroup = RtlEqualSid (owner_sid, group_sid);
bool userisowner = RtlEqualSid (owner_sid, cygheap->user.sid ());
for (DWORD i = 0; i < acl->AceCount; ++i)
{
if (!NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (acl, i, (PVOID *) &ace)))
continue;
if (ace->Header.AceFlags & INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)
continue;
switch (ace->Header.AceType)
{
case ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE:
flags = &allow;
anti = &deny;
break;
case ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE:
flags = &deny;
anti = &allow;
break;
default:
continue;
}
cygpsid ace_sid ((PSID) &ace->SidStart);
if (ace_sid == well_known_world_sid)
{
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IROTH)) ? S_IROTH : 0)
| ((!isownergroup && !(*anti & S_IRGRP)) ? S_IRGRP : 0)
| ((!(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWOTH)) ? S_IWOTH : 0)
| ((!isownergroup && !(*anti & S_IWGRP)) ? S_IWGRP : 0)
| ((!(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXOTH)) ? S_IXOTH : 0)
| ((!isownergroup && !(*anti & S_IXGRP)) ? S_IXGRP : 0)
| ((!(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
if ((S_ISDIR (*attribute)) &&
(ace->Mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_EXECUTE | FILE_DELETE_CHILD))
== (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_EXECUTE))
*flags |= S_ISVTX;
}
else if (ace_sid == well_known_null_sid)
{
/* Read SUID, SGID and VTX bits from NULL ACE. */
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_DATA)
*flags |= S_ISVTX;
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_DATA)
*flags |= S_ISGID;
if (ace->Mask & FILE_APPEND_DATA)
*flags |= S_ISUID;
}
else if (ace_sid == owner_sid)
{
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
/* Apply deny mask to group if group SID == owner SID. */
if (group_sid && isownergroup
&& ace->Header.AceType == ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE)
{
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRGRP : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWGRP : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXGRP : 0);
}
}
else if (ace_sid == group_sid)
{
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IRGRP)) ? S_IRGRP : 0)
| ((grp_member && !(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWGRP)) ? S_IWGRP : 0)
| ((grp_member && !(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXGRP)) ? S_IXGRP : 0)
| ((grp_member && !(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
}
else if (flags == &allow)
{
/* Simplified computation of additional group permissions based on
the CLASS_OBJ value. CLASS_OBJ represents the or'ed value of
the primary group permissions and all secondary user and group
permissions. FIXME: This only takes ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACEs into
account. The computation with additional ACCESS_DENIED_ACE
handling is much more complicated. */
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
*flags |= S_IRGRP;
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
*flags |= S_IWGRP;
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
*flags |= S_IXGRP;
/* If the current user is the owner of the file, check if the
additional SIDs are in the user's token. Note that this is
some ugly hack, but a full-fledged solution requires to
create tokens or perhaps using AUTHZ. */
BOOL ret;
if (userisowner
&& CheckTokenMembership (cygheap->user.issetuid ()
? cygheap->user.imp_token () : NULL,
ace_sid, &ret)
&& ret)
{
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
*flags |= (!(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0;
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
*flags |= (!(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0;
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
*flags |= (!(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0;
}
}
}
*attribute &= ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO | S_ISVTX | S_ISGID | S_ISUID);
#if 0
/* Disable owner/group permissions equivalence if owner SID == group SID.
It's technically not quite correct, but it helps in case a security
conscious application checks if a file has too open permissions. In
fact, since owner == group, there's no security issue here. */
if (owner_sid && group_sid && RtlEqualSid (owner_sid, group_sid)
/* FIXME: temporary exception for /var/empty */
&& well_known_system_sid != group_sid)
{
allow &= ~(S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP);
allow |= (((allow & S_IRUSR) ? S_IRGRP : 0)
| ((allow & S_IWUSR) ? S_IWGRP : 0)
| ((allow & S_IXUSR) ? S_IXGRP : 0));
}
#endif
*attribute |= allow;
}
static void
get_info_from_sd (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd, mode_t *attribute,
uid_t *uidret, gid_t *gidret)
{
if (!psd)
{
/* If reading the security descriptor failed, treat the object
as unreadable. */
if (attribute)
*attribute &= ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
if (uidret)
*uidret = ILLEGAL_UID;
if (gidret)
*gidret = ILLEGAL_GID;
return;
}
cygpsid owner_sid;
cygpsid group_sid;
NTSTATUS status;
BOOLEAN dummy;
status = RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (psd, (PSID *) &owner_sid, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
debug_printf ("RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor: %y", status);
status = RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor (psd, (PSID *) &group_sid, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
debug_printf ("RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor: %y", status);
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
bool grp_member = get_sids_info (owner_sid, group_sid, &uid, &gid);
if (uidret)
*uidret = uid;
if (gidret)
*gidret = gid;
if (!attribute)
{
syscall_printf ("uid %u, gid %u", uid, gid);
return;
}
PACL acl;
BOOLEAN acl_exists;
status = RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (psd, &acl_exists, &acl, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
*attribute &= ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
}
else if (!acl_exists || !acl)
*attribute |= S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO;
else
get_attribute_from_acl (attribute, acl, owner_sid, group_sid, grp_member);
syscall_printf ("%sACL %y, uid %u, gid %u",
(!acl_exists || !acl)?"NO ":"", *attribute, uid, gid);
}
static int
get_reg_sd (HANDLE handle, security_descriptor &sd_ret)
{
@ -473,7 +282,7 @@ get_reg_attribute (HKEY hkey, mode_t *attribute, uid_t *uidret,
if (!get_reg_sd (hkey, sd))
{
get_info_from_sd (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret);
get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0);
return 0;
}
/* The entries are already set to default values */
@ -490,7 +299,7 @@ get_file_attribute (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc,
if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, false))
{
get_info_from_sd (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret);
get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0);
return 0;
}
/* ENOSYS is returned by get_file_sd if fetching the DACL from a remote
@ -518,8 +327,8 @@ get_file_attribute (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc,
}
bool
add_access_allowed_ace (PACL acl, int offset, DWORD attributes,
PSID sid, size_t &len_add, DWORD inherit)
add_access_allowed_ace (PACL acl, DWORD attributes, PSID sid, size_t &len_add,
DWORD inherit)
{
NTSTATUS status = RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (acl, ACL_REVISION, inherit,
attributes, sid);
@ -533,8 +342,8 @@ add_access_allowed_ace (PACL acl, int offset, DWORD attributes,
}
bool
add_access_denied_ace (PACL acl, int offset, DWORD attributes,
PSID sid, size_t &len_add, DWORD inherit)
add_access_denied_ace (PACL acl, DWORD attributes, PSID sid, size_t &len_add,
DWORD inherit)
{
NTSTATUS status = RtlAddAccessDeniedAceEx (acl, ACL_REVISION, inherit,
attributes, sid);
@ -547,367 +356,6 @@ add_access_denied_ace (PACL acl, int offset, DWORD attributes,
return true;
}
static PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR
alloc_sd (path_conv &pc, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int attribute,
security_descriptor &sd_ret)
{
NTSTATUS status;
BOOLEAN dummy;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
/* NOTE: If the high bit of attribute is set, we have just created
a file or directory. See below for an explanation. */
debug_printf("uid %u, gid %u, attribute 0%o", uid, gid, attribute);
/* Get owner and group from current security descriptor. */
PSID cur_owner_sid = NULL;
PSID cur_group_sid = NULL;
status = RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &cur_owner_sid, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
debug_printf ("RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor: %y", status);
status = RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &cur_group_sid, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
debug_printf ("RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor: %y", status);
/* Get SID of owner. */
cygsid owner_sid;
/* Check for current user first */
if (uid == myself->uid)
owner_sid = cygheap->user.sid ();
else if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID)
owner_sid = cur_owner_sid;
else if (!owner_sid.getfrompw (internal_getpwuid (uid)))
{
set_errno (EINVAL);
return NULL;
}
owner_sid.debug_print ("alloc_sd: owner SID =");
/* Get SID of new group. */
cygsid group_sid;
/* Check for current user first */
if (gid == myself->gid)
group_sid = cygheap->user.groups.pgsid;
else if (gid == ILLEGAL_GID)
group_sid = cur_group_sid;
else if (!group_sid.getfromgr (internal_getgrgid (gid)))
{
set_errno (EINVAL);
return NULL;
}
group_sid.debug_print ("alloc_sd: group SID =");
/* Initialize local security descriptor. */
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
/* We set the SE_DACL_PROTECTED flag here to prevent the DACL from being
modified by inheritable ACEs. */
RtlSetControlSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SE_DACL_PROTECTED, SE_DACL_PROTECTED);
/* Create owner for local security descriptor. */
status = RtlSetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (&sd, owner_sid, FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
/* Create group for local security descriptor. */
status = RtlSetGroupSecurityDescriptor (&sd, group_sid, FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
/* Initialize local access control list. */
PACL acl = (PACL) tp.w_get ();
RtlCreateAcl (acl, ACL_MAXIMUM_SIZE, ACL_REVISION);
/* From here fill ACL. */
size_t acl_len = sizeof (ACL);
int ace_off = 0;
/* Only used for sync objects (for ttys). The admins group should
always have the right to manipulate the ACL, so we have to make sure
that the ACL gives the admins group STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL access. */
bool saw_admins = false;
/* Construct allow attribute for owner.
Don't set FILE_READ/WRITE_ATTRIBUTES unconditionally on Samba, otherwise
it enforces read permissions. Same for other's below. */
DWORD owner_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL
| (pc.fs_is_samba ()
? 0 : (FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES));
if (attribute & S_IRUSR)
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
if (attribute & S_IWUSR)
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
if (attribute & S_IXUSR)
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE & ~FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
&& (attribute & (S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR)) == (S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR))
owner_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
/* For sync objects note that the owner is admin. */
if (S_ISCHR (attribute) && owner_sid == well_known_admins_sid)
saw_admins = true;
/* Construct allow attribute for group. */
DWORD group_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ | SYNCHRONIZE
| (pc.fs_is_samba () ? 0 : FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES);
if (attribute & S_IRGRP)
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
if (attribute & S_IWGRP)
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
if (attribute & S_IXGRP)
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE & ~FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
&& (attribute & (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP)) == (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP)
&& !(attribute & S_ISVTX))
group_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
/* For sync objects, add STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL for admins group. */
if (S_ISCHR (attribute) && group_sid == well_known_admins_sid)
{
group_allow |= STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL;
saw_admins = true;
}
/* Construct allow attribute for everyone. */
DWORD other_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ | SYNCHRONIZE
| (pc.fs_is_samba () ? 0 : FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES);
if (attribute & S_IROTH)
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
if (attribute & S_IWOTH)
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
if (attribute & S_IXOTH)
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE & ~FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
&& (attribute & (S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH)) == (S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH)
&& !(attribute & S_ISVTX))
other_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
/* Construct SUID, SGID and VTX bits in NULL ACE. */
DWORD null_allow = 0L;
if (attribute & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX))
{
if (attribute & S_ISUID)
null_allow |= FILE_APPEND_DATA;
if (attribute & S_ISGID)
null_allow |= FILE_WRITE_DATA;
if (attribute & S_ISVTX)
null_allow |= FILE_READ_DATA;
}
/* Add owner and group permissions if SIDs are equal
and construct deny attributes for group and owner. */
bool isownergroup;
if ((isownergroup = (owner_sid == group_sid)))
owner_allow |= group_allow;
DWORD owner_deny = ~owner_allow & (group_allow | other_allow);
owner_deny &= ~(STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ
| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
DWORD group_deny = ~group_allow & other_allow;
group_deny &= ~(STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES);
/* Set deny ACE for owner. */
if (owner_deny
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_deny,
owner_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set deny ACE for group here to respect the canonical order,
if this does not impact owner */
if (group_deny && !(group_deny & owner_allow) && !isownergroup
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_deny,
group_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for owner. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_allow,
owner_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set deny ACE for group, if still needed. */
if ((group_deny & owner_allow) && !isownergroup
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_deny,
group_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for group. */
if (!isownergroup
&& !add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_allow,
group_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* For sync objects, if we didn't see the admins group so far, add entry
with STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL access. */
if (S_ISCHR (attribute) && !saw_admins)
{
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL,
well_known_admins_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
saw_admins = true;
}
/* Set allow ACE for everyone. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, other_allow,
well_known_world_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set null ACE for special bits. */
if (null_allow
&& !add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, null_allow,
well_known_null_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Fill ACL with unrelated ACEs from current security descriptor. */
PACL oacl;
BOOLEAN acl_exists = FALSE;
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
status = RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &acl_exists, &oacl, &dummy);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && acl_exists && oacl)
for (DWORD i = 0; i < oacl->AceCount; ++i)
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (oacl, i, (PVOID *) &ace)))
{
cygpsid ace_sid ((PSID) &ace->SidStart);
/* Always skip NULL SID as well as admins SID on virtual device files
in /proc/sys. */
if (ace_sid == well_known_null_sid
|| (S_ISCHR (attribute) && ace_sid == well_known_admins_sid))
continue;
/* Check for ACEs which are always created in the preceding code
and check for the default inheritence ACEs which will be created
for just created directories. Skip them for just created
directories or if they are not inherited. If they are inherited,
make sure they are *only* inherited, so they don't collide with
the permissions set in this function. */
if ((ace_sid == cur_owner_sid)
|| (ace_sid == owner_sid)
|| (ace_sid == cur_group_sid)
|| (ace_sid == group_sid)
|| (ace_sid == well_known_creator_owner_sid)
|| (ace_sid == well_known_creator_group_sid)
|| (ace_sid == well_known_world_sid))
{
if ((S_ISDIR (attribute) && (attribute & S_JUSTCREATED))
|| (ace->Header.AceFlags
& (CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE | OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE)) == 0)
continue;
else
ace->Header.AceFlags |= INHERIT_ONLY_ACE;
}
if (attribute & S_JUSTCREATED)
{
/* Since files and dirs are created with a NULL descriptor,
inheritence rules kick in. If no inheritable entries exist
in the parent object, Windows will create entries from the
user token's default DACL in the file DACL. These entries
are not desired and we drop them silently. */
if (!(ace->Header.AceFlags & INHERITED_ACE))
continue;
/* Remove the INHERITED_ACE flag since on POSIX systems
inheritance is settled when the file has been created.
This also avoids error messages in Windows Explorer when
opening a file's security tab. Explorer complains if
inheritable ACEs are preceding non-inheritable ACEs. */
ace->Header.AceFlags &= ~INHERITED_ACE;
/* However, if the newly created object is a directory,
it inherits the default ACL from its parent, so mark
all unrelated, inherited ACEs inheritable. */
if (S_ISDIR (attribute))
ace->Header.AceFlags |= CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
| OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE;
}
else if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID && gid == ILLEGAL_UID
&& ace->Header.AceType == ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
&& ace_sid != well_known_creator_group_sid
&& ace_sid != well_known_creator_owner_sid
&& ace_sid != well_known_world_sid)
{
/* FIXME: Temporary workaround for the problem that chmod does
not affect the group permissions if other users and groups
in the ACL have more permissions than the primary group due
to the CLASS_OBJ emulation. The temporary workaround is to
disallow any secondary ACE in the ACL more permissions than
the primary group when writing a new ACL via chmod. */
ace->Mask &= group_allow;
}
/* Add unrelated ACCESS_DENIED_ACE to the beginning but behind
the owner_deny, ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE to the end. FIXME: this
would break the order of the inherit-only ACEs. */
status = RtlAddAce (acl, ACL_REVISION,
ace->Header.AceType == ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE
? (owner_deny ? 1 : 0) : MAXDWORD,
(LPVOID) ace, ace->Header.AceSize);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
ace_off++;
acl_len += ace->Header.AceSize;
}
/* Construct appropriate inherit attribute for new directories. Keep in
mind that we do this only for the sake of non-Cygwin applications.
Cygwin applications don't need this. */
if (S_ISDIR (attribute) && (attribute & S_JUSTCREATED))
{
const DWORD inherit = CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE | OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE
| INHERIT_ONLY_ACE;
/* Set allow ACE for owner. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_allow,
well_known_creator_owner_sid, acl_len,
inherit))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for group. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_allow,
well_known_creator_group_sid, acl_len,
inherit))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for everyone. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, other_allow,
well_known_world_sid, acl_len, inherit))
return NULL;
}
/* Set AclSize to computed value. */
acl->AclSize = acl_len;
debug_printf ("ACL-Size: %d", acl_len);
/* Create DACL for local security descriptor. */
status = RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor (&sd, TRUE, acl, FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
/* Make self relative security descriptor. */
DWORD sd_size = 0;
RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
if (sd_size <= 0)
{
__seterrno ();
return NULL;
}
if (!sd_ret.malloc (sd_size))
{
set_errno (ENOMEM);
return NULL;
}
status = RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
debug_printf ("Created SD-Size: %u", sd_ret.size ());
return sd_ret;
}
void
set_security_attribute (path_conv &pc, int attribute, PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES psa,
security_descriptor &sd)
@ -915,8 +363,9 @@ set_security_attribute (path_conv &pc, int attribute, PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES psa,
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = sd.malloc (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) psa->lpSecurityDescriptor,
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = alloc_sd (pc, geteuid32 (), getegid32 (),
attribute, sd);
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = set_posix_access (attribute, geteuid32 (),
getegid32 (), NULL, 0,
sd, false);
}
int
@ -952,22 +401,24 @@ get_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t *uidret, gid_t *gidret,
mode_t *attribute)
{
security_descriptor sd;
mode_t attr = S_IFCHR;
if (get_object_sd (handle, sd))
return -1;
get_info_from_sd (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret);
return 0;
if (attribute)
*attribute |= S_IFCHR;
else
attribute = &attr;
return get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0)
>= 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
int
create_object_sd_from_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
mode_t attribute, security_descriptor &sd)
create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t attribute,
security_descriptor &sd)
{
path_conv pc;
if ((handle && get_object_sd (handle, sd))
|| !alloc_sd (pc, uid, gid, attribute, sd))
return -1;
return 0;
return set_posix_access (S_IFCHR | attribute, uid, gid, NULL, 0, sd, false)
? 0 : -1;
}
int
@ -985,36 +436,98 @@ set_object_sd (HANDLE handle, security_descriptor &sd, bool chown)
}
int
set_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
mode_t attribute)
set_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t attribute)
{
security_descriptor sd;
if (create_object_sd_from_attribute (handle, uid, gid, attribute, sd)
if (create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid, gid, attribute, sd)
|| set_object_sd (handle, sd, uid != ILLEGAL_UID || gid != ILLEGAL_GID))
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
set_file_attribute (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t attribute)
set_created_file_access (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc, mode_t attr)
{
int ret = -1;
security_descriptor sd, sd_ret;
mode_t attr_rd;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
aclent_t *aclp;
int nentries, idx;
if (pc.has_acls ())
if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, true))
{
security_descriptor sd;
if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, (bool)(attribute & S_JUSTCREATED))
&& alloc_sd (pc, uid, gid, attribute, sd))
ret = set_file_sd (handle, pc, sd,
uid != ILLEGAL_UID || gid != ILLEGAL_GID);
attr |= S_JUSTCREATED;
if (pc.isdir ())
attr |= S_IFDIR;
attr_rd = attr;
aclp = (aclent_t *) tp.c_get ();
if ((nentries = get_posix_access (sd, &attr_rd, &uid, &gid,
aclp, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES)) >= 0)
{
if (S_ISLNK (attr))
{
/* Symlinks always get the request POSIX perms. */
aclp[0].a_perm = (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, GROUP_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if (nentries > MIN_ACL_ENTRIES
&& (idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, CLASS_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, OTHER_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = attr & S_IRWXO;
}
else
{
/* Overwrite ACL permissions as required by POSIX 1003.1e
draft 17. */
aclp[0].a_perm &= (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
/* Deliberate deviation from POSIX 1003.1e here. We're not
writing CLASS_OBJ *or* GROUP_OBJ, but both. Otherwise we're
going to be in constant trouble with user expectations. */
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, GROUP_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm &= (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if (nentries > MIN_ACL_ENTRIES
&& (idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, CLASS_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm &= (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, OTHER_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm &= attr & S_IRWXO;
}
/* Construct appropriate inherit attribute for new directories.
Basically we do this only for the sake of non-Cygwin applications.
Cygwin applications don't need these. Additionally, if the
S_ISGID bit is set, propagate it. */
if (S_ISDIR (attr))
{
if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_USER_OBJ) < 0)
{
aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_USER_OBJ;
aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_UID;
aclp[nentries++].a_perm = (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
}
if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_GROUP_OBJ) < 0)
{
aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_GROUP_OBJ;
aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_GID;
aclp[nentries++].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
}
if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_OTHER_OBJ) < 0)
{
aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_OTHER_OBJ;
aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_UID;
aclp[nentries++].a_perm = attr & S_IRWXO;
}
if (attr_rd & S_ISGID)
attr |= S_ISGID;
}
if (set_posix_access (attr, uid, gid, aclp, nentries, sd_ret,
pc.fs_is_samba ()))
ret = set_file_sd (handle, pc, sd_ret, attr_rd & S_ISGID);
}
}
else
ret = 0;
syscall_printf ("%d = set_file_attribute(%S, %d, %d, 0%o)",
ret, pc.get_nt_native_path (), uid, gid, attribute);
return ret;
}
@ -1165,7 +678,7 @@ convert_samba_sd (security_descriptor &sd_ret)
ace_sid.getfromgr (grp);
}
}
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, i, ace->Mask, ace_sid, acl_len,
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace->Mask, ace_sid, acl_len,
ace->Header.AceFlags))
return;
}

View File

@ -436,20 +436,19 @@ class path_conv;
/* File manipulation */
int __reg3 get_file_attribute (HANDLE, path_conv &, mode_t *,
uid_t *, gid_t *);
int __reg3 set_file_attribute (HANDLE, path_conv &,
uid_t, gid_t, mode_t);
int __reg3 set_created_file_access (HANDLE, path_conv &, mode_t);
int __reg2 get_object_sd (HANDLE, security_descriptor &);
int __reg3 get_object_attribute (HANDLE, uid_t *, gid_t *, mode_t *);
int __reg3 set_object_attribute (HANDLE, uid_t, gid_t, mode_t);
int __reg3 create_object_sd_from_attribute (HANDLE, uid_t, gid_t,
mode_t, security_descriptor &);
int __reg3 create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid_t, gid_t, mode_t,
security_descriptor &);
int __reg3 set_object_sd (HANDLE, security_descriptor &, bool);
int __reg3 get_reg_attribute (HKEY hkey, mode_t *, uid_t *, gid_t *);
LONG __reg3 get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &, security_descriptor &, bool);
LONG __reg3 set_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &, security_descriptor &, bool);
bool __reg3 add_access_allowed_ace (PACL, int, DWORD, PSID, size_t &, DWORD);
bool __reg3 add_access_denied_ace (PACL, int, DWORD, PSID, size_t &, DWORD);
bool __reg3 add_access_allowed_ace (PACL, DWORD, PSID, size_t &, DWORD);
bool __reg3 add_access_denied_ace (PACL, DWORD, PSID, size_t &, DWORD);
int __reg3 check_file_access (path_conv &, int, bool);
int __reg3 check_registry_access (HANDLE, int, bool);
@ -463,6 +462,11 @@ bool get_sids_info (cygpsid, cygpsid, uid_t * , gid_t *);
struct acl;
extern "C" int aclsort32 (int, int, struct acl *);
extern "C" int acl32 (const char *, int, int, struct acl *);
int searchace (struct acl *, int, int, uid_t id = ILLEGAL_UID);
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR set_posix_access (mode_t, uid_t, gid_t, struct acl *, int,
security_descriptor &, bool);
int get_posix_access (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, mode_t *, uid_t *, gid_t *,
struct acl *, int);
int getacl (HANDLE, path_conv &, int, struct acl *);
int setacl (HANDLE, path_conv &, int, struct acl *, bool &);

View File

@ -1434,8 +1434,7 @@ open (const char *unix_path, int flags, ...)
}
else if ((fh->is_fs_special ()
&& fh->device_access_denied (flags))
|| !fh->open_with_arch (flags, (mode & 07777)
& ~cygheap->umask))
|| !fh->open_with_arch (flags, mode & 07777))
delete fh;
else
{

View File

@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
2015-11-18 Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
* utils.xml (setfacl): Show new option output.
(getfacl): Show new option output.
2015-11-17 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
* new-features.xml (ov-new2.4): New section. Document rpmatch.

View File

@ -590,18 +590,21 @@ Other options:
<refsynopsisdiv>
<screen>
getfacl [-adn] FILE [FILE2...]
getfacl [-adceEn] FILE [FILE2...]
</screen>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>Options</title>
<screen>
-a, --access display the file access control list
-d, --default display the default access control list
-h, --help print help explaining the command line options
-n, --noname display user and group IDs instead of names
-V, --version output version information and exit
-a, --access display the file access control list only
-d, --default display the default access control list only
-c, --omit-header do not display the comment header
-e, --all-effective print all effective rights
-E, --no-effective print no effective rights
-n, --numeric print numeric user/group identifiers
-V, --version print version and exit
-h, --help this help text
When multiple files are specified on the command line, a blank
line separates the ACLs for each file.
@ -1965,29 +1968,27 @@ Example: regtool get '\user\software\Microsoft\Clock\iFormat'
<refsynopsisdiv>
<screen>
setfacl [-r] {-f ACL_FILE | -s acl_entries} FILE...
setfacl [-r] {-b|[-d acl_entries] [-m acl_entries]} FILE...
setfacl [-n] {-f ACL_FILE | -s acl_entries} FILE...
setfacl [-n] {-b|-k|[-x acl_entries] [-m acl_entries]} FILE...
</screen>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>Options</title>
<screen>
-b, --remove-all remove all extended ACL entries
-d, --delete delete one or more specified ACL entries
-f, --file set ACL entries for FILE to ACL entries read
from a ACL_FILE
-k, --remove-default
remove all default ACL entries
-m, --modify modify one or more specified ACL entries
-r, --replace replace mask entry with maximum permissions
needed for the file group class
-s, --substitute substitute specified ACL entries for the
ACL of FILE
-h, --help output usage information and exit
-V, --version output version information and exit
-b, --remove-all remove all extended ACL entries\n"
-x, --delete delete one or more specified ACL entries\n"
-f, --file set ACL entries for FILE to ACL entries read\n"
from ACL_FILE\n"
-k, --remove-default remove all default ACL entries\n"
-m, --modify modify one or more specified ACL entries\n"
-n, --no-mask don't recalculate the effective rights mask\n"
--mask do recalculate the effective rights mask\n"
-s, --substitute substitute specified ACL entries on FILE\n"
-V, --version print version and exit\n"
-h, --help this help text\n"
At least one of (-b, -d, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified
At least one of (-b, -x, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified\n"
</screen>
</refsect1>
@ -1996,8 +1997,8 @@ At least one of (-b, -d, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified
<para> For each file given as parameter, <command>setfacl</command> will
either replace its complete ACL (<literal>-s</literal>,
<literal>-f</literal>), or it will add, modify, or delete ACL entries.
For more information on Cygwin and Windows ACLs, see see <xref
linkend="ntsec"/> in the Cygwin User's Guide. </para>
For more information on Cygwin and Windows ACLs, see
<xref linkend="ntsec"/> in the Cygwin User's Guide. </para>
<para> Acl_entries are one or more comma-separated ACL entries from the
following list:
@ -2024,13 +2025,14 @@ At least one of (-b, -d, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified
<para> The following options are supported: </para>
<para> <literal>-b</literal> Remove all extended ACL entries. The base
ACL entries of the owner, group and others are retained.</para>
<para> <literal>-b</literal>,<literal>--remove-all</literal> Remove all
extended ACL entries. The base ACL entries of the owner, group and
others are retained.</para>
<para> <literal>-d</literal> Delete one or more specified entries from the
file's ACL. The owner, group and others entries must not be deleted.
Acl_entries to be deleted should be specified without permissions, as in
the following list:
<para> <literal>-x</literal>,<literal>--delete</literal> Delete one or
more specified entries from the file's ACL. The owner, group and others
entries must not be deleted. Acl_entries to be deleted should be
specified without permissions, as in the following list:
<screen>
u[ser]:uid[:]
g[roup]:gid[:]
@ -2041,11 +2043,12 @@ At least one of (-b, -d, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified
d[efault]:o[ther][:]
</screen> </para>
<para> <literal>-f</literal> Take the Acl_entries from ACL_FILE one per
line. Whitespace characters are ignored, and the character "#" may be
used to start a comment. The special filename "-" indicates reading from
stdin. Note that you can use this with <command>getfacl</command> and
<command>setfacl</command> to copy ACLs from one file to another:
<para> <literal>-f</literal>,<literal>--file</literal> Take the Acl_entries
from ACL_FILE one per line. Whitespace characters are ignored, and the
character "#" may be used to start a comment. The special filename "-"
indicates reading from stdin. Note that you can use this with
<command>getfacl</command> and <command>setfacl</command> to copy ACLs
from one file to another:
<screen>
$ getfacl source_file | setfacl -f - target_file
</screen> </para>
@ -2061,22 +2064,31 @@ $ getfacl source_file | setfacl -f - target_file
file, one default group entry for the group of the file, one default mask
entry for the file group class, and one default other entry. </para>
<para> <literal>-k</literal> Remove all default ACL entries. If no default
ACL entries exist, no warnings are issued. </para>
<para> <literal>-k</literal>,<literal>--remove-default</literal> Remove all
default ACL entries. If no default ACL entries exist, no warnings are
issued. </para>
<para> <literal>-m</literal> Add or modify one or more specified ACL
entries. Acl_entries is a comma-separated list of entries from the same
list as above. </para>
<para> <literal>-m</literal>,<literal>--modify</literal> Add or modify one
or more specified ACL entries. Acl_entries is a comma-separated list of
entries from the same list as above. </para>
<para> <literal>-r</literal> Causes the permissions specified in the mask
entry to be ignored and replaced by the maximum permissions needed for
the file group class. </para>
<para> <literal>-n</literal>,<literal>--no-mask</literal> Valid in
conjunction with -m. Do not recalculate the effective rights mask.
The default behavior of setfacl is to recalculate the ACL mask entry,
unless a mask entry was explicitly given. The mask entry is set to
the union of all permissions of the owning group, and all named user
and group entries. (These are exactly the entries affected by the
mask entry). </para>
<para> <literal>-s</literal> Like <literal>-f</literal>, but substitute the
file's ACL with Acl_entries specified in a comma-separated list on the
command line. </para>
<para> <literal>--mask</literal> Valid in conjunction with -m. Do
recalculate the effective rights mask, even if an ACL mask entry was
explicitly given. (See the -n option.) </para>
<para> While the <literal>-d</literal> and <literal>-m</literal> options
<para> <literal>-s</literal>,<literal>--substitute</literal> Like
<literal>-f</literal>, but substitute the file's ACL with Acl_entries
specified in a comma-separated list on the command line. </para>
<para> While the <literal>-x</literal> and <literal>-m</literal> options
may be used in the same command, the <literal>-f</literal> and
<literal>-s</literal> options may be used only exclusively. </para>

View File

@ -1,3 +1,31 @@
2015-11-18 Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
Reapply POSIX ACL changes.
* getfacl.c (main): Special-case SYSTEM and Admins group. Add comments.
* setfacl.c: Align more to Linux tool.
(delacl): New function to delete acl entries only.
(modacl): Drop delete functionality. Add handling of recomputing the
mask and default mask values.
(delallacl): Rename from delacl.
(setfacl): Call delacl in Delete case. Call delallacl in DeleteAll
and DeleteDef case.
(usage): Accommodate new options. Rearrange and rephrase slightly.
(longopts): Emit 'x' in --delete case. Add --no-mask and --mask
options.
(opts): Add -x and -n options.
(main): Handle -d and -x the same. Handle -n and --mask options.
Drop handling for -r option.
* getfacl.c (usage): Align more closely to Linux version. Add new
options -c, -e, -E. Change formatting to accommodate longer options.
(longopts): Rename --noname to --numeric. Keep --noname for backward
compatibility. Add --omit-header, --all-effective and --no-effective
options.
(opts): Add -c, -e and -E option.
(main): Handle new -c, -e, and -E options.
2015-10-22 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
* getconf.c (conf_table): Add LEVEL*_CACHE_* variables.

View File

@ -66,61 +66,68 @@ static void
usage (FILE * stream)
{
fprintf (stream, "Usage: %s [-adn] FILE [FILE2...]\n"
"\n"
"Display file and directory access control lists (ACLs).\n"
"\n"
" -a, --access display the file access control list\n"
" -d, --default display the default access control list\n"
" -h, --help print help explaining the command line options\n"
" -n, --noname display user and group IDs instead of names\n"
" -V, --version output version information and exit\n"
"\n"
"When multiple files are specified on the command line, a blank\n"
"line separates the ACLs for each file.\n", prog_name);
"\n"
"Display file and directory access control lists (ACLs).\n"
"\n"
" -a, --access display the file access control list only\n"
" -d, --default display the default access control list only\n"
" -c, --omit-header do not display the comment header\n"
" -e, --all-effective print all effective rights\n"
" -E, --no-effective print no effective rights\n"
" -n, --numeric print numeric user/group identifiers\n"
" -V, --version print version and exit\n"
" -h, --help this help text\n"
"\n"
"When multiple files are specified on the command line, a blank\n"
"line separates the ACLs for each file.\n", prog_name);
if (stream == stdout)
{
fprintf (stream, ""
"For each argument that is a regular file, special file or\n"
"directory, getfacl displays the owner, the group, and the ACL.\n"
"For directories getfacl displays additionally the default ACL.\n"
"\n"
"With no options specified, getfacl displays the filename, the\n"
"owner, the group, the setuid (s), setgid (s), and sticky (t)\n"
"bits if available, and both the ACL and the default ACL, if it\n"
"exists.\n"
"\n"
"The format for ACL output is as follows:\n"
" # file: filename\n"
" # owner: name or uid\n"
" # group: name or uid\n"
" # flags: sst\n"
" user::perm\n"
" user:name or uid:perm\n"
" group::perm\n"
" group:name or gid:perm\n"
" mask:perm\n"
" other:perm\n"
" default:user::perm\n"
" default:user:name or uid:perm\n"
" default:group::perm\n"
" default:group:name or gid:perm\n"
" default:mask:perm\n"
" default:other:perm\n"
"\n");
"For each argument that is a regular file, special file or\n"
"directory, getfacl displays the owner, the group, and the ACL.\n"
"For directories getfacl displays additionally the default ACL.\n"
"\n"
"With no options specified, getfacl displays the filename, the\n"
"owner, the group, the setuid (s), setgid (s), and sticky (t)\n"
"bits if available, and both the ACL and the default ACL, if it\n"
"exists.\n"
"\n"
"The format for ACL output is as follows:\n"
" # file: filename\n"
" # owner: name or uid\n"
" # group: name or uid\n"
" # flags: sst\n"
" user::perm\n"
" user:name or uid:perm\n"
" group::perm\n"
" group:name or gid:perm\n"
" mask:perm\n"
" other:perm\n"
" default:user::perm\n"
" default:user:name or uid:perm\n"
" default:group::perm\n"
" default:group:name or gid:perm\n"
" default:mask:perm\n"
" default:other:perm\n"
"\n");
}
}
struct option longopts[] = {
{"access", no_argument, NULL, 'a'},
{"all", no_argument, NULL, 'a'},
{"omit-header", no_argument, NULL, 'c'},
{"all-effective", no_argument, NULL, 'e'},
{"no-effective", no_argument, NULL, 'E'},
{"default", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
{"dir", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{"noname", no_argument, NULL, 'n'},
{"noname", no_argument, NULL, 'n'}, /* Backward compat */
{"numeric", no_argument, NULL, 'n'},
{"version", no_argument, NULL, 'V'},
{0, no_argument, NULL, 0}
};
const char *opts = "adhnV";
const char *opts = "acdeEhnV";
static void
print_version ()
@ -142,8 +149,11 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
int c;
int ret = 0;
int aopt = 0;
int copt = 0;
int eopt = 0;
int dopt = 0;
int nopt = 0;
int istty = isatty (fileno (stdout));
struct stat st;
aclent_t acls[MAX_ACL_ENTRIES];
@ -155,9 +165,18 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
case 'a':
aopt = 1;
break;
case 'c':
copt = 1;
break;
case 'd':
dopt = 1;
break;
case 'e':
eopt = 1;
break;
case 'E':
eopt = -1;
break;
case 'h':
usage (stdout);
return 0;
@ -179,6 +198,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
for (; optind < argc; ++optind)
{
int i, num_acls;
mode_t mask = S_IRWXO, def_mask = S_IRWXO;
if (stat (argv[optind], &st)
|| (num_acls = acl (argv[optind], GETACL, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, acls)) < 0)
{
@ -187,28 +208,42 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
ret = 2;
continue;
}
printf ("# file: %s\n", argv[optind]);
if (nopt)
if (!copt)
{
printf ("# owner: %lu\n", (unsigned long)st.st_uid);
printf ("# group: %lu\n", (unsigned long)st.st_gid);
printf ("# file: %s\n", argv[optind]);
if (nopt)
{
printf ("# owner: %lu\n", (unsigned long)st.st_uid);
printf ("# group: %lu\n", (unsigned long)st.st_gid);
}
else
{
printf ("# owner: %s\n", username (st.st_uid));
printf ("# group: %s\n", groupname (st.st_gid));
}
if (st.st_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX))
printf ("# flags: %c%c%c\n", (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) ? 's' : '-',
(st.st_mode & S_ISGID) ? 's' : '-',
(st.st_mode & S_ISVTX) ? 't' : '-');
}
else
{
printf ("# owner: %s\n", username (st.st_uid));
printf ("# group: %s\n", groupname (st.st_gid));
}
if (st.st_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX))
printf ("# flags: %c%c%c\n", (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) ? 's' : '-',
(st.st_mode & S_ISGID) ? 's' : '-',
(st.st_mode & S_ISVTX) ? 't' : '-');
for (i = 0; i < num_acls; ++i)
{
if (acls[i].a_type == CLASS_OBJ)
mask = acls[i].a_perm;
else if (acls[i].a_type == DEF_CLASS_OBJ)
def_mask = acls[i].a_perm;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_acls; ++i)
{
int n = 0;
int print_effective = 0;
mode_t effective = acls[i].a_perm;
if (acls[i].a_type & ACL_DEFAULT)
{
if (aopt)
continue;
printf ("default:");
n += printf ("default:");
}
else if (dopt)
continue;
@ -219,18 +254,18 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
break;
case USER:
if (nopt)
printf ("user:%lu:", (unsigned long)acls[i].a_id);
n += printf ("user:%lu:", (unsigned long)acls[i].a_id);
else
printf ("user:%s:", username (acls[i].a_id));
n += printf ("user:%s:", username (acls[i].a_id));
break;
case GROUP_OBJ:
printf ("group::");
n += printf ("group::");
break;
case GROUP:
if (nopt)
printf ("group:%lu:", (unsigned long)acls[i].a_id);
n += printf ("group:%lu:", (unsigned long)acls[i].a_id);
else
printf ("group:%s:", groupname (acls[i].a_id));
n += printf ("group:%s:", groupname (acls[i].a_id));
break;
case CLASS_OBJ:
printf ("mask:");
@ -239,7 +274,53 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
printf ("other:");
break;
}
printf ("%s\n", permstr (acls[i].a_perm));
n += printf ("%s", permstr (acls[i].a_perm));
switch (acls[i].a_type)
{
case USER:
case GROUP_OBJ:
effective = acls[i].a_perm & mask;
print_effective = 1;
break;
case GROUP:
/* Special case SYSTEM and Admins group: The mask only
applies to them as far as the execute bit is concerned. */
if (acls[i].a_id == 18 || acls[i].a_id == 544)
effective = acls[i].a_perm & (mask | S_IROTH | S_IWOTH);
else
effective = acls[i].a_perm & mask;
print_effective = 1;
break;
case DEF_USER:
case DEF_GROUP_OBJ:
effective = acls[i].a_perm & def_mask;
print_effective = 1;
break;
case DEF_GROUP:
/* Special case SYSTEM and Admins group: The mask only
applies to them as far as the execute bit is concerned. */
if (acls[i].a_id == 18 || acls[i].a_id == 544)
effective = acls[i].a_perm & (def_mask | S_IROTH | S_IWOTH);
else
effective = acls[i].a_perm & def_mask;
print_effective = 1;
break;
}
if (print_effective && eopt >= 0
&& (eopt > 0 || effective != acls[i].a_perm))
{
if (istty)
{
n = 40 - n;
if (n <= 0)
n = 1;
printf ("%*s", n, " ");
}
else
putchar ('\t');
printf ("#effective:%s", permstr (effective));
}
putchar ('\n');
}
putchar ('\n');
}

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* setfacl.c
Copyright 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014
Red Hat Inc.
Copyright 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014,
2015 Red Hat Inc.
Written by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ typedef enum {
SetFromFile
} action_t;
int mask_opt = 0;
mode_t getperm (char *in)
{
if (isdigit ((unsigned char) *in) && !in[1])
@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ searchace (aclent_t *aclp, int nentries, int type, int id)
}
int
modacl (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt, aclent_t *src, int scnt)
delacl (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt, aclent_t *src, int scnt)
{
int t, s, i;
@ -249,25 +251,115 @@ modacl (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt, aclent_t *src, int scnt)
(src[s].a_type & (USER | GROUP)) ? src[s].a_id : -1);
if (t < 0)
return -1;
if (src[s].a_perm == ILLEGAL_MODE)
if (t < tcnt)
{
if (t < tcnt)
{
for (i = t + 1; i < tcnt; ++i)
tgt[i - 1] = tgt[i];
--tcnt;
}
}
else
{
tgt[t] = src[s];
if (t >= tcnt)
++tcnt;
for (i = t + 1; i < tcnt; ++i)
tgt[i - 1] = tgt[i];
--tcnt;
}
}
return tcnt;
}
int
modacl (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt, aclent_t *src, int scnt)
{
int t, s;
int recompute_mask = 0, recompute_def_mask = 0;
int need_mask = 0, need_def_mask = 0;
int has_mask = 0, has_def_mask = 0;
int mask_idx = -1, def_mask_idx = -1;
mode_t mask = 0, def_mask = 0;
/* Replace or add given acl entries. */
for (s = 0; s < scnt; ++s)
{
t = searchace (tgt, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, src[s].a_type,
(src[s].a_type & (USER | GROUP)) ? src[s].a_id : -1);
if (t < 0)
return -1;
tgt[t] = src[s];
if (t >= tcnt)
++tcnt;
/* Note if CLASS_OBJ and/or DEF_CLASS_OBJ are present in input. */
if (src[s].a_type == CLASS_OBJ)
has_mask = 1;
else if (src[s].a_type == DEF_CLASS_OBJ)
has_def_mask = 1;
else if (src[s].a_type & ACL_DEFAULT)
recompute_def_mask = 1;
else
recompute_mask = 1;
}
/* Now recompute mask, if requested (default) */
for (t = 0; t < tcnt; ++t)
{
switch (tgt[t].a_type)
{
case USER:
case GROUP:
/* Do we need a CLASS_OBJ at all? */
need_mask = 1;
/*FALLTHRU*/
case GROUP_OBJ:
/* Compute resulting maximum mask. */
mask |= tgt[t].a_perm;
break;
case CLASS_OBJ:
/* Do we already have a CLASS_OBJ? */
mask_idx = t;
break;
case DEF_USER:
case DEF_GROUP:
/* Do we need a DEF_CLASS_OBJ at all? */
need_def_mask = 1;
/*FALLTHRU*/
case DEF_GROUP_OBJ:
/* Compute resulting maximum default mask. */
def_mask |= tgt[t].a_perm;
break;
case DEF_CLASS_OBJ:
/* Do we already have a DEF_CLASS_OBJ? */
def_mask_idx = t;
break;
}
}
/* Recompute mask, if requested */
if (recompute_mask && need_mask && mask_opt >= 0
&& (mask_opt > 0 || !has_mask))
{
if (mask_idx >= 0)
t = mask_idx;
else
t = searchace (tgt, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, CLASS_OBJ, -1);
if (t < 0)
return -1;
if (t >= tcnt)
++tcnt;
tgt[t].a_type = CLASS_OBJ;
tgt[t].a_id = -1;
tgt[t].a_perm = mask;
}
/* Recompute default mask, if requested */
if (recompute_def_mask && need_def_mask && mask_opt >= 0
&& (mask_opt > 0 || !has_def_mask))
{
if (def_mask_idx >= 0)
t = def_mask_idx;
else
t = searchace (tgt, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, DEF_CLASS_OBJ, -1);
if (t < 0)
return -1;
if (t >= tcnt)
++tcnt;
tgt[t].a_type = DEF_CLASS_OBJ;
tgt[t].a_id = -1;
tgt[t].a_perm = def_mask;
}
return tcnt;
}
int
addmissing (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt)
{
@ -333,7 +425,7 @@ addmissing (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt)
}
int
delacl (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt, action_t action)
delallacl (aclent_t *tgt, int tcnt, action_t action)
{
int t;
@ -369,7 +461,7 @@ setfacl (action_t action, const char *path, aclent_t *acls, int cnt)
break;
case Delete:
if ((lcnt = acl (path, GETACL, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, lacl)) < 0
|| (lcnt = modacl (lacl, lcnt, acls, cnt)) < 0
|| (lcnt = delacl (lacl, lcnt, acls, cnt)) < 0
|| (lcnt = acl (path, SETACL, lcnt, lacl)) < 0)
{
perror (prog_name);
@ -379,7 +471,7 @@ setfacl (action_t action, const char *path, aclent_t *acls, int cnt)
case DeleteAll:
case DeleteDef:
if ((lcnt = acl (path, GETACL, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, lacl)) < 0
|| (lcnt = delacl (lacl, lcnt, action)) < 0
|| (lcnt = delallacl (lacl, lcnt, action)) < 0
|| (lcnt = acl (path, SETACL, lcnt, lacl)) < 0)
{
perror (prog_name);
@ -404,114 +496,126 @@ static void
usage (FILE *stream)
{
fprintf (stream, ""
"Usage: %s [-r] {-f ACL_FILE | -s acl_entries} FILE...\n"
" %s [-r] {-b|[-d acl_entries] [-m acl_entries]} FILE...\n"
"\n"
"Modify file and directory access control lists (ACLs)\n"
"\n"
" -b, --remove-all remove all extended ACL entries\n"
" -d, --delete delete one or more specified ACL entries\n"
" -f, --file set ACL entries for FILE to ACL entries read\n"
" from a ACL_FILE\n"
" -k, --remove-default\n"
" remove all default ACL entries\n"
" -m, --modify modify one or more specified ACL entries\n"
" -r, --replace replace mask entry with maximum permissions\n"
" needed for the file group class\n"
" -s, --substitute substitute specified ACL entries for the\n"
" ACL of FILE\n"
" -h, --help output usage information and exit\n"
" -V, --version output version information and exit\n"
"\n"
"At least one of (-b, -d, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified\n"
"\n", prog_name, prog_name);
if (stream == stdout)
{
printf(""
" Acl_entries are one or more comma-separated ACL entries \n"
" from the following list:\n"
"\n"
" u[ser]::perm\n"
" u[ser]:uid:perm\n"
" g[roup]::perm\n"
" g[roup]:gid:perm\n"
" m[ask]:perm\n"
" o[ther]:perm\n"
"\n"
" Default entries are like the above with the additional\n"
" default identifier. For example: \n"
"\n"
" d[efault]:u[ser]:uid:perm\n"
"\n"
" 'perm' is either a 3-char permissions string in the form\n"
" \"rwx\" with the character - for no permission\n"
" or it is the octal representation of the permissions, a\n"
" value from 0 (equivalent to \"---\") to 7 (\"rwx\").\n"
" 'uid' is a user name or a numerical uid.\n"
" 'gid' is a group name or a numerical gid.\n"
"\n"
"\n"
"For each file given as parameter, %s will either replace its\n"
"complete ACL (-s, -f), or it will add, modify, or delete ACL\n"
"entries.\n"
"\n"
"The following options are supported:\n"
"\n"
"-b Remove all extended ACL entries. The base ACL entries of the\n"
" owner, group and others are retained.\n"
"\n"
"-d Delete one or more specified entries from the file's ACL.\n"
" The owner, group and others entries must not be deleted.\n"
" Acl_entries to be deleted should be specified without\n"
" permissions, as in the following list:\n"
"\n"
" u[ser]:uid[:]\n"
" g[roup]:gid[:]\n"
" m[ask][:]\n"
" d[efault]:u[ser][:uid]\n"
" d[efault]:g[roup][:gid]\n"
" d[efault]:m[ask][:]\n"
" d[efault]:o[ther][:]\n"
"\n"
"-f Take the Acl_entries from ACL_FILE one per line. Whitespace\n"
" characters are ignored, and the character \"#\" may be used\n"
" to start a comment. The special filename \"-\" indicates\n"
" reading from stdin.\n"
" Required entries are\n"
" - One user entry for the owner of the file.\n"
" - One group entry for the group of the file.\n"
" - One other entry.\n"
" If additional user and group entries are given:\n"
" - A mask entry for the file group class of the file.\n"
" - No duplicate user or group entries with the same uid/gid.\n"
" If it is a directory:\n"
" - One default user entry for the owner of the file.\n"
" - One default group entry for the group of the file.\n"
" - One default mask entry for the file group class.\n"
" - One default other entry.\n"
"\n"
"-k Remove all default ACL entries. If no default ACL entries\n"
" exist, no warnings are issued.\n"
"\n"
"-m Add or modify one or more specified ACL entries.\n"
" Acl_entries is a comma-separated list of entries from the \n"
" same list as above.\n"
"\n"
"-r Causes the permissions specified in the mask entry to be\n"
" ignored and replaced by the maximum permissions needed for\n"
" the file group class.\n"
"\n"
"-s Like -f, but substitute the file's ACL with Acl_entries\n"
" specified in a comma-separated list on the command line.\n"
"\n"
"While the -d and -m options may be used in the same command, the\n"
"-f and -s options may be used only exclusively.\n"
"\n"
"Directories may contain default ACL entries. Files created\n"
"in a directory that contains default ACL entries will have\n"
"permissions according to the combination of the current umask,\n"
"the explicit permissions requested and the default ACL entries\n"
"\n", prog_name);
"Usage: %s {-f ACL_FILE | -s acl_entries} FILE...\n"
" %s {-b|[-x acl_entries] [-m acl_entries]} FILE...\n"
"\n"
"Modify file and directory access control lists (ACLs)\n"
"\n"
" -b, --remove-all remove all extended ACL entries\n"
" -x, --delete delete one or more specified ACL entries\n"
" -f, --file set ACL entries for FILE to ACL entries read\n"
" from ACL_FILE\n"
" -k, --remove-default remove all default ACL entries\n"
" -m, --modify modify one or more specified ACL entries\n"
" -n, --no-mask don't recalculate the effective rights mask\n"
" --mask do recalculate the effective rights mask\n"
" -s, --substitute substitute specified ACL entries on FILE\n"
" -V, --version print version and exit\n"
" -h, --help this help text\n"
"\n"
"At least one of (-b, -x, -f, -k, -m, -s) must be specified\n"
"\n", prog_name, prog_name);
if (stream == stdout)
{
printf(""
" Acl_entries are one or more comma-separated ACL entries \n"
" from the following list:\n"
"\n"
" u[ser]::perm\n"
" u[ser]:uid:perm\n"
" g[roup]::perm\n"
" g[roup]:gid:perm\n"
" m[ask]:perm\n"
" o[ther]:perm\n"
"\n"
" Default entries are like the above with the additional\n"
" default identifier. For example: \n"
"\n"
" d[efault]:u[ser]:uid:perm\n"
"\n"
" 'perm' is either a 3-char permissions string in the form\n"
" \"rwx\" with the character - for no permission\n"
" or it is the octal representation of the permissions, a\n"
" value from 0 (equivalent to \"---\") to 7 (\"rwx\").\n"
" 'uid' is a user name or a numerical uid.\n"
" 'gid' is a group name or a numerical gid.\n"
"\n"
"\n"
"For each file given as parameter, %s will either replace its\n"
"complete ACL (-s, -f), or it will add, modify, or delete ACL\n"
"entries.\n"
"\n"
"The following options are supported:\n"
"\n"
"-b, --remove-all\n"
" Remove all extended ACL entries. The base ACL entries of the\n"
" owner, group and others are retained.\n"
"\n"
"-x, --delete\n"
" Delete one or more specified entries from the file's ACL.\n"
" The owner, group and others entries must not be deleted.\n"
" Acl_entries to be deleted should be specified without\n"
" permissions, as in the following list:\n"
"\n"
" u[ser]:uid[:]\n"
" g[roup]:gid[:]\n"
" m[ask][:]\n"
" d[efault]:u[ser][:uid]\n"
" d[efault]:g[roup][:gid]\n"
" d[efault]:m[ask][:]\n"
" d[efault]:o[ther][:]\n"
"\n"
"-f, --file\n"
" Take the Acl_entries from ACL_FILE one per line. Whitespace\n"
" characters are ignored, and the character \"#\" may be used\n"
" to start a comment. The special filename \"-\" indicates\n"
" reading from stdin.\n"
" Required entries are\n"
" - One user entry for the owner of the file.\n"
" - One group entry for the group of the file.\n"
" - One other entry.\n"
" If additional user and group entries are given:\n"
" - A mask entry for the file group class of the file.\n"
" - No duplicate user or group entries with the same uid/gid.\n"
" If it is a directory:\n"
" - One default user entry for the owner of the file.\n"
" - One default group entry for the group of the file.\n"
" - One default mask entry for the file group class.\n"
" - One default other entry.\n"
"\n"
"-k, --remove-default\n"
" Remove all default ACL entries. If no default ACL entries exist,\n"
" no warnings are issued.\n"
"\n"
"-m, --modify\n"
" Add or modify one or more specified ACL entries. Acl_entries is\n"
" a comma-separated list of entries from the same list as above.\n"
"\n"
"-n, --no-mask\n"
" Valid in conjunction with -m. Do not recalculate the effective\n"
" rights mask. The default behavior of setfacl is to recalculate the\n"
" ACL mask entry, unless a mask entry was explicitly given. The\n"
" mask entry is set to the union of all permissions of the owning\n"
" group, and all named user and group entries. (These are exactly\n"
" the entries affected by the mask entry).\n"
"\n"
"--mask\n"
" Valid in conjunction with -m. Do recalculate the effective rights\n"
" mask, even if an ACL mask entry was explicitly given. (See the\n"
" -n option.)\n"
"\n"
"-s, --substitute\n"
" Like -f, but substitute the file's ACL with ACL entries\n"
" specified in a comma-separated list on the command line.\n"
"\n"
"While the -x and -m options may be used in the same command, the\n"
"-f and -s options may be used only exclusively.\n"
"\n"
"Directories may contain default ACL entries. Files created\n"
"in a directory that contains default ACL entries will have\n"
"permissions according to the combination of the current umask,\n"
"the explicit permissions requested and the default ACL entries\n"
"\n", prog_name);
}
else
fprintf(stream, "Try '%s --help' for more information.\n", prog_name);
@ -519,17 +623,19 @@ usage (FILE *stream)
struct option longopts[] = {
{"remove-all", no_argument, NULL, 'b'},
{"delete", required_argument, NULL, 'd'},
{"delete", required_argument, NULL, 'x'},
{"file", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
{"remove-default", no_argument, NULL, 'k'},
{"modify", required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
{"no-mask", required_argument, NULL, 'n'},
{"mask", required_argument, NULL, '\n'},
{"replace", no_argument, NULL, 'r'},
{"substitute", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{"version", no_argument, NULL, 'V'},
{0, no_argument, NULL, 0}
};
const char *opts = "bd:f:hkm:rs:V";
const char *opts = "bd:f:hkm:nrs:Vx";
static void
print_version ()
@ -550,7 +656,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
action_t action = NoAction;
int ropt = 0;
aclent_t acls[MAX_ACL_ENTRIES];
int aclidx = 0;
int ret = 0;
@ -570,7 +675,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
return 1;
}
break;
case 'd':
case 'd': /* Backward compat */
case 'x':
if (action == NoAction)
action = Delete;
else if (action == Modify)
@ -628,14 +734,13 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
return 2;
}
break;
case 'n':
mask_opt = -1;
break;
case '\n':
mask_opt = 1;
break;
case 'r':
if (!ropt)
ropt = 1;
else
{
usage (stderr);
return 1;
}
break;
case 's':
if (action == NoAction)